Introduction
Recent studies provide evidence that relatively higher levels of financial market development do indeed tend to lead to higher levels of economic performance. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) , Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) , all report significant evidence supporting the proposition that higher levels of financial market development lead to higher levels of economic growth. These papers are very careful to develop reasonable structural instruments to proxy for the relative amount of local financial market development.
In this paper, we investigate whether local financial market development helps to promote economic performance by focusing on a particular rationale for such a relationship. That rationale is financial market development may increase the amount of external finance available to small firms. Specifically, we examine whether a government intervention aimed at increasing small firms' access to bank credit has a relatively greater impact in less financially developed markets in the U.S. And, we use SBA loan guarantees as our government invention method. We choose the small firm credit market because of the high degree of information asymmetry that may be associated with it. And, because this information asymmetry may lead to a credit rationing problem as explained in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) .
We focus on the SBA guaranteed lending program because our previous research (Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2007) suggests that SBA guaranteed lending has a small positive influence on the rate of economic growth in local geographic markets. Also, our study is motivated by the important results reported in a recent paper by Riding and Haines (2001) . Drawing on empirical evidence to compare costs and benefits, Riding 2 and Haines (2001) is one of the very few studies to demonstrate that the net contribution of a guaranteed lending program is positive. They conclude that the Canadian loan guarantee program resulted in substantial total and incremental employment creation, and had a net positive effect on economic welfare. Additionally, Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2008) found that loan guarantees tend to have a greater impact on employment creation in less financially developed markets. The ideas that loan guarantee programs generally have net positive impacts on employment and that the magnitude of these impacts may differ across local geographic markets leads to the fundamental research question for this paper. That question is this: Does local market financial development tend to mitigate the positive impact that loan guarantees tend to have on the level of local market employment? In this paper, our null hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed lending does not impact less financially developed markets differently than more financially developed markets. And, our primary alternative hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed lending has a greater impact on the employment rate in less financially developed markets. This alternative hypothesis is based on three related assumptions. These three assumptions are: less developed financial markets are more likely to experience severe information asymmetry problems, and as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out, that could lead to credit rationing, (2) SBA guaranteed lending is likely to reduce these credit rationing problems --thus, improving the level of development of that local financial market, and (3) increased financial development helps to lubricate the wheels of economic performance and increase the effective level of labor utilization, or the employment rate (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) .
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We use a measure of liquidity based on local market bank deposits to measure financial market development. Our results suggest that less financially developed markets are more positively impacted by SBA guaranteed lending. Moreover, the positive impact of SBA guaranteed lending for high financially developed markets is economically insignificant. This result has important implications for public policy in general and SBA guaranteed lending in particular.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide some background on small business credit markets and economic performance. In section 3 we provide a brief review of the academic literature on credit rationing. This literature is consistent with the hypothesis that information problems in lending markets are particularly severe in the small firm credit market and hence provides a rationale for SBA loan guarantees. An analysis of SBA lending programs is presented in section 4.
The data, our hypotheses, and empirical strategy are outlined in section 5. The results are presented in section 6. Finally, our conclusions and some discussion of the implications of our research are provided in section 7.
Background on small business credit markets and economic growth
A particular area of concern for policymakers is whether small businesses have access to adequate credit. Liquidity constraints prevent many would-be entrepreneurs from starting businesses because they must bear all of the risk (Evans & Jovanovich, 1989) . Policy makers care about this issue because net increases in small businesses are positively related to overall economic activity (Kirchoff & Phillips, 1988) and states with higher proportions of very small business employment experience higher levels of productivity growth with less wage inflation and lower unemployment rates (Robbins, 4 Pantuosco, Parker, & Fuller, 2000) . At the same time, however, most small firms are relatively young and have little or no credit history. Lenders may also be reluctant to fund small firms with new and innovative products because of the difficulty associated with evaluating the risk of such products. These difficulties are classic information problems-problems obtaining sufficient information about the parties involved in a transaction-and they may prevent otherwise creditworthy firms from obtaining credit.
If information problems are substantial, they can lead to credit rationing, that is, loans are allocated by some mechanism other than price (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) . To the extent that credit rationing significantly affects small business credit markets, a rationale exists for supporting small enterprises through government programs aimed at improving small business access to credit. While not directly comparable because SBA guaranteed loan numbers include loans by nonbank lenders and include loans above the $1 million loan maximum reported by banks annually on the June call report, it is clear that the SBA is an important player 5 in the small business lending market. After all, SBA guaranteed loans could reasonably account for as much as 10% of total commercial bank small business loans outstanding.
And, commercial banks provide the majority of small business credit supplied in the USA.
To illustrate its importance to small businesses, Bitler, Robb, and Wolken (2001) report that commercial bank lending represents about one-third of total debt capital for these firms. Using the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances, they report that fifty-five percent of small firms (firms with 500 or fewer employees) in the Survey report some amount of outstanding loans, capital leases or lines of credit. And, ninety-two percent of the largest small firms (those with 100-500 employees) reported having outstanding loans, capital leases, or lines of credit. Additionally, of all firms reporting, about 89 percent received at least one financial service (checking account, loan, cash management service, etc.) from a commercial bank.
The rationale for SBA guarantees appears to be that credit market imperfections can result in small enterprises being credit rationed-particularly for longer-term loans for purposes such as capital expansion. If SBA loan guarantees indeed reduce credit rationing in the markets for small business loans, then there should be a relationship between measures of SBA guaranteed lending activities and economic performance. Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007) , for example, found a positive (although small) and significant relationship between the level of SBA lending in a local market and future per capita income growth in that market. Overall, their empirical results were consistent with a positive impact on the social welfare of SBA guaranteed lending. Craig, Jackson, and Thomson's (2007) research focused primarily on the impact of credit markets on 6 economic growth, however, and therefore they did not need to include several variables from the economic development literature in their analysis. However, we believe the inclusion of several of these variables is appropriate for this paper. In general, we include control variables that have been demonstrated to effect local market employment rates.
We recognize that the private and public resources available to a community or local area will have a profound impact on its employment level. This is also true for the depth and organizational structure of it capital, labor, and other markets. Additionally, the operations of its institutions (e.g., local government) will impact educational attainment, public service levels, the overall quality of life, and the areas' ability to attract and retain high quality employers. We consider the impact of these characteristics in this study. In particular, in this study we use a simplified version of the analysis in Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007) to evaluate a potential determinant of economic performance in less financially developed markets, or communities. Specifically, we test whether SBA guaranteed lending to small firms has a relatively greater impact on the average level of labor employment in local markets that are less financially developed.
We find that it does.
In the next section, we provide a brief discussion of the economics of small firm credit markets. This discussion focuses on a highly select group of theoretical and empirical articles that help explain the severe credit allocation problems caused by imperfect information in small firm credit markets. These articles also provide insight into the mechanism that allow a government intervention, such as the SBA guaranteed lending program, to result in higher economic performance in less financially developed markets.
The economics of small firm credit markets
The economic justification for any government-sponsored small business lending program or loan guarantee program must rest on a generally acknowledged failure of private markets to allocate loans efficiently. Absent such a clearly identified problem with private sector lending to small businesses, the SBA's activities would simply seem a wasteful, politically motivated subsidy to this sector of the economy.
Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss (1981) , suggest that private lending institutions may indeed fail to allocate loans efficiently because of fundamental information problems in the market for small business loans. These information problems may be so severe that they lead to credit rationing and constitute failure of the private credit market. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that banks consider both the interest rate they receive on the loan and the riskiness of the loan when deciding to make a loan. But the lack of perfect information in loan markets may cause two effects that allow the interest rate itself to affect the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio. When the price affects the nature of the transaction, it is unlikely that a price will emerge that suits either the available buyers or sellers. That is, no price will "clear the market". The first effect, adverse selection, impedes the ability of markets to allocate credit using price (e.g., interest rates). This may occur because an increase in interest rates may also increase the proportion of high risk borrowers in the set of likely borrowers. The second effect, moral hazard, reduces the ability of interests rates to clear lending markets because it influences the ex post actions of borrowers.
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The adverse selection effect is a consequence of different borrowers having different probabilities of repaying their loans. The expected return to the bank on a loan obviously depends on the probability of repayment, so the bank would like to be able to identify borrowers who are more likely to repay. But it is difficult to identify such borrowers. Typically, the bank will use a variety of screening devices to do so. The interest rate that a borrower is willing to pay may act as one such screening device. For example, those who are willing to pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on average, worse risks. These borrowers are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate because they perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be lower. In turn, this worsens the pool of firms that seek external financing from banks (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) . So, as the interest rate rises, the average "riskiness" of those who are willing to borrow increases, and this may actually result in lowering the bank's expected profits from lending.
Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of the contract change, the behavior of the borrower is likely to also change. For instance, raising the interest rate decreases the profitability of projects which succeed because of the associated higher interest payments. Higher interest rates may thus induce firms to undertake riskier projectsprojects with lower probabilities of success but higher payoffs when successful. In other words, the interest rate a firm pays for credit may affect the investment decisions it makes after it gets the credit. This is the moral hazard problem.
As a result of these two effects, a bank's expected return may increase less for an additional increase in the interest rate; and, beyond a certain point may actually decrease as the interest rate is increased. Clearly, under these conditions, it is conceivable that the demand for credit may exceed the supply of credit in equilibrium (Berger & Udell, 1998; Hyytinen, A., & Väänänen, L. 2006) . Although traditional analysis would argue that in the presence of an excess demand for credit, unsatisfied borrowers would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the bank, bidding up the interest rate until demand equals supply, it does not happen in this case. This is because the bank would not lend to someone who offered to pay the higher interest rate, as such a borrower is likely to be a worse risk than the average current borrower. The expected return on a loan to this borrower at the higher interest rate may be actually lower than the expected return on the loans the bank is currently making. Hence, there are no competitive forces leading supply to equal demand, and credit is rationed. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that when borrowers are distinguishable, the lender may decide to deny credit to an entire group. This is their classic redlining argument. We expect the likelihood of this type of credit rationing to be higher in less financially developed communities. Furthermore, because the value of collecting information on borrowers may be lower in less financially developed markets, the levels of imperfect information may be higher in less financially developed markets.
Small Business Administration loan guarantee programs
SBA loan guarantees may improve credit allocation by providing a mechanism for pricing loans that is independent of borrower behavior. By reducing the expected loss associated with a loan default, the guarantee increases the expected return to the lenderwithout increasing the lending rate. In the absence of adverse selection, lenders could simply offer loan rates to borrowers that reflected the average risk of the pool of borrowers. 2 With the guarantee in place, the lender could profitably extend credit at loan rates below what would be dictated by the risk of the average borrower. The reason for this is that the guarantee increases the profitability of the loan by reducing the losses to the bank in those instances when the borrower defaults. To the extent that the loan guarantees reduce the rate of interest at which banks are willing to lend, external loan guarantees will help mitigate the moral hazard problem. This is because the lower lending rates afforded by external guarantees reduce the bankruptcy threshold and thereby increase the expected return of safe projects vis-à-vis riskier ones. Additionally, lowering the lending rate increases the number of low risk borrowers applying for credit which, in turn, increases the likelihood that the average risk of firms applying for loans is representative of the pool of borrowers. Hence, external loan guarantees also help mitigate the adverse selection problem. Thus, in theory, SBA loan guarantees should reduce the probability that a viable small business is credit rationed.
A number of authors [for instance, Kane and Malkiel (1965) , Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Petersen (1999) ] have suggested that lending relationships are a market-based solution to credit rationing. However, because relationships may be more costly for small businesses to establish relative to large businesses, and because lack of relationships may lead to severe credit rationing in the small business credit market, some form of government intervention to assist small businesses in establishing relationships with lenders may be appropriate. However, the nature of intervention must be carefully evaluated. SBA's guaranteed lending programs may well be a reasonable intervention as they serve as a substitute for small business collateral. The program also reduces the risk to the lender of establishing a relationship with informationally opaque small business 11 borrowers. Finally, the SBA loan guarantee programs may improve the intermediation process by lowering the risk to the lender of extending longer-term loans, ones that more closely meet the needs of small businesses for capital investment. (See Appendix B for a discussion of the details about the SBA guaranteed lending process.)
The hypotheses, data, and empirical strategy
One method likely to reduce the costs of credit rationing is to reduce the amount of asymmetric information in these credit markets. One very practical method for doing this is to encourage lenders to make creditworthy loans that they would not otherwise make. And, in so doing the lender develops a "relationship" with the borrower. This relationship allows for the low-cost collection of borrower-specific information through basic monitoring of the loan. This reduces future levels of asymmetric information and reduces credit rationing by fostering a continuing relationship between the small business and the lending entity located in the less financially developed market.
We choose to study the impact of SBA guaranteed lending programs because this is where the empirical evidence is likely to be strongest concerning the impact of government intervention in small business credit markets. This conclusion is based on three observations. First, the SBA guaranteed lending programs are relatively large and have operated for a long time-more than a half a century. Second, SBA loan guarantees are more likely to resolve the agency problems that give rise to credit rationing in these markets than most other approaches, like that of the Federal Home Loan Banks. And, third, SBA guaranteed lending programs encompass all types of small business lenders, from community banks and thrifts to bigger banks.
We take as our motivating proposition that credit market frictions-primarily in the form of costly information and verification of a small firm's projects-can lead to a socially suboptimal credit allocation that negatively impacts the labor employment rate in the local market. Our implicit assumption here is that labor and capital are complements...at least for small firms. To the extent that SBA guaranteed lending programs mitigate credit market frictions, there should be a positive relationship between SBA guaranteed lending and the level of employment, especially in less financially developed markets. Therefore, we test for whether SBA loan guarantees lessen credit market frictions by testing whether a measure of the normalized amount of SBA guaranteed lending in a local market is correlated with relatively higher levels of employment in less financially developed markets. Our specific null hypothesis is:
Ho: There are no significant differences in the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on employment rates in less financially developed markets relative to more financially developed markets.
Data
To examine our hypothesis, we utilize data from three sources. Our first source is loan-specific data-including borrower and lender information-on all SBA-guaranteed 7(a) and 504 loans from 2 January 1991 through 31 December 2001. A breakdown of loan size, total credit and number of loans under each guarantee program is displayed in tables A1 through A3 of the appendix. Note that we have over 360,000 loans in our sample. Our loan information is based on the local market of the borrower, not the lender.
Our second set of data is taken from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis 13 (BEA) from 1991 through 2001. These data sets provide our information on crosssectional economic conditions. Our third source of data is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's annual summary of deposit data (SUMD) files. This data provides our proxy for the level of financial market development.
All of our individual loan data are aggregated to the local market level. For this study, we also aggregate over time to produce cross-sectional observations for our local markets. As in studies by Rhoades (1982) , Berger and Hannon (1989) , Calem and Carlino (1991 ), Jackson (1992a , 1992b , Shaffer (1994 Shaffer ( , 2004 , and Berger (1995) , we use Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to define the relevant local market for urban areas and non-MSA counties as the local market for rural areas.
Empirical Strategy
To test our null hypothesis we simplify the analysis of Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007) . These authors estimate their models using classic Arellano and Bond panel regression estimation techniques. In this study, we estimate a simple crosssectional Generalized Least Squares (GLS) fixed-effects regression model that incorporates measures of employment levels over our sample period. Our basic model is:
Equation (1) We are interested in how SBA guaranteed lending affects the cross-sectional levels of EMPR. The primary variables of interest on the right side of Equation (1) DEPPOP is the average of the annual per capita bank deposits in the local market over the sample period. It is measured in thousands of dollars per capita. Before averaging, each of these annual per capita bank deposit amounts was inflation adjusted to 1990 dollars using the consumer price index. We use DEPPOP as a proxy for the total credit and liquidity available in the local market over our sample period. King and Levine (1993a) suggest that the local market deposit base is a reasonable measure of market liquidity and financial development. This is also consistent with previous research such as Peterson and Rajan (1995) . Our local market per capita bank deposits are calculated using FDIC Summary of Deposit data and the U.S. Census Bureau population data.
The dummy variable HIGH is equal to one, zero otherwise, if the local market average annual per capita bank deposits over the sample period is greater than the seventy-fifth percentile (third quartile) average annual level for our sample. SBAHIGH is 15 an interaction variable equal to the dummy variable (HIGH) times local market average annual per capita SBA guaranteed lending (SBAPOP).
SBAHIGH is our main variable of interest. A negative and significant coefficient on SBAHIGH would imply that the impact of SBAPOP is smaller in areas with higher levels of average annual per capita bank deposits, or higher levels of financial market development. Or, stated differently, SBA guaranteed lending has a relatively larger positive impact in those local markets that are less financially developed.
Conditioning Set of Variables
Following Levine (1997) and Shaffer (2006), we add a set of control, or conditioning, variables to Equation (1) PICAP is the average annual per capita income level in the local market over our sample period. It is measured in thousands of dollars per capita. Before averaging, each annual per capita income level was inflation adjusted to 1990 dollars using the consumer price index. Local market per capita income data was collected from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau.
HERF is the average sum of squares of the deposit shares of the commercial banks in the local market over our sample period. HERF is intended to be a measure of the competitiveness of the local banking market. However, it is often difficult to interpret. We calculate HERF using the FDIC's Summary of Deposit (SUMD) database.
It is calculated on an annual basis using yearend data. These annual calculations are then averaged over the 1991-2001 time period to get the local market HERF for our study.
MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if the local market is a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). If the local market is not an MSA, it is
typically a non-MSA county. We use this indicator variable to distinguish between urban and rural areas. Dummy variables of this sort have been shown to be significant in previous studies (Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2007) . Data for this variable was collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
EDUCAT is the percentage of local population over the age of 25 with at least four years of college as of yearend 1990. It was collected from the website of the U.S.
Census Bureau. It is our measure of human capital differences across local markets.
GOVT is a measure of local government expenditures (in thousands of dollars) per
capital (1991) (1992) . This is similar to the measure used by Shaffer (2006) . It was collected from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau.
RETAIL is the percentage share of employment in retail (as opposed to manufacturing, or services) as of yearend 1990 in the local market. This data was also collected from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau.
Lastly, OFFICE is the average number of commercial bank offices in the local market over the sample period. It is calculated from the FDIC's Summary of Deposit database using yearend counts of the number of offices and averaging those counts over the 1991 to 2001 period.
The Empirical Results
Before discussing our results, we briefly summarize the conditions of the bank credit market for small firms over our sample period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . Data from the Federal Reserve Board's Senior Loan Officer Surveys (Surveys) suggest three major trends over this period. First, the demand for bank commercial and industrial (C&I) loans by small firms rose moderately during the first third of the period, remained strong and steady during the second third, and declined sharply during the last third. Second, the Surveys report a steady easing of underwriting standards during the first two-thirds of the period and a reversal or tightening of standards during the final third of the period. Lastly, the Surveys indicate that spreads on loans to small firms increased slightly during the first third, declined rapidly during the second third, and increased sharply during the final third of the period. Nonetheless, there are no indications from the Surveys that the C&I bank loan market caused a severe constraint on the credit available to small firms over our study period. Indeed, the evidence supports the notion of a well functioning small firm credit market.
Equation (1) is estimated using a GLS fixed-effects method. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression can be found in Table 1 , and a correlation coefficients matrix for our main variables is presented in Table 2 . Our regression estimation results are presented in Table 3 . Notice from In Table 2 we present a correlation matrix for our main variables. There are several correlation coefficients in Table 2 These correlation coefficients for our independent and control variables suggest that multicollinearity may be a concern for the relationships between several of our variables. These concerns about multicollinearity were evaluated using a varianceinflation-factor (VIF) method.
In Table 3 we present the main results for our study. These results are estimated using a GLS fixed-effects method. The fixed-effects class variable is the state in which the local market is located. Focusing on individual states as our fixed effect allows us to control for variations in state specific factors associated with systematic influences on employment levels within the same state. Examples of these state specific factors are human capital endowments unrelated to measures of educational attainment, technological endowments and advancement, and state level public policies designed to influence employment rates.
Notice from Table 3 , model 1, that the coefficient (0.016) on SBAPOP is positive and significant at the one percent level. However, in model 2 of Table 3 , where our conditioning variables are added, the coefficient for SBAPOP is much smaller (0.008) but still statistically significant. A similar story is observed for the independent variable
DEPPOP.
The coefficient on HIGH is positive, economically large, and significant at the one percent level in both model two (1.91) and three (1.94) . This strongly suggests that local markets at the high end of our financial developed scale tend to exhibit higher employment levels. This is what was expected.
Our main result for this study is associated with the coefficient on SBAHIGH.
The coefficient on SBAHIGH is negative and statistically significant in both models. It is a negative 0.015 in model two and 0.007 in model three. The results for SBAPOP and SBAHIGH taken together strongly suggest that the impact of SBA guaranteed lending has a more positive and significant impact on employment in less financially developed markets. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on SBAHIGH implies that the positive and significant impact of SBA guaranteed lending per capita (SBAPOP) on local market employment is reduced from a coefficient of 0.008 to a coefficient of 0.001 (0.008+(-0.007)). Or, stated differently, the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on local market employment in less financially developed markets is eight times its impact in 20 highly financially developed markets. These results have very significant public policy implications for how SBA guaranteed lending should be directed.
Conditioning Variables
The coefficients on most of our conditioning (or control) variables are consistent with our expectations and with previous literature such as Shafter (2006) and Levine (1997). For example, P1CAP has a large, positive and significant coefficient (0.42) in Table 3 , model 3. This suggests that higher per capita incomes are associated with higher rates of employment.
Our next conditioning variable, HERF, exhibits a large, positive, and statistically significant coefficient in Table 3 , model 3. Thus, the results from Table 3 suggest that local market deposit concentration (HERF) has a positive and significant impact on local market employment (EMPR). However, HERF may act as a proxy for low-density rural markets. So, we do not accredit any competitive interpretation to this coefficient.
MSADUM is our next conditioning variable. The insignificant coefficient on MSADUM in Table 3 suggests that on average over our sample period employment rates tended to be similar in metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) as they were in non-MSA counties.
Our next four conditioning variables were selected to link our analysis more closely to the economic development and economic growth literatures (Shaffer 2006 ).
These variables include EDUCAT, GOVT, RETAIL, and OFFICE. Recall that EDUCAT
is the percentage of the population in the local market over the age of 25 who have completed at least four years of college. GOVT is a measure of local government expenditures (in thousands of dollars) per capital (1991) (1992) . RETAIL is the percentage share of employment in retail (as opposed to manufacturing, or services) as of yearend 1990 in the local market. And, OFFICE is the average number of commercial bank offices in the local market over the sample period.
As might be expected, the coefficient (0.10) on EDUCAT is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. This also true for the variable GOVT and RETAIL. Additionally, the coefficient on OFFICE is negative and significant, but economically small.
Overall, these results lead to the rejection of our null hypothesis. Recall that our null hypothesis is that the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on employment rates in lower financially developed markets is the same as it is in higher financially developed markets.
Our results imply that less financially developed local markets benefit relatively more from governmental interventions in the small firm credit market. This relatively higher benefit is consistent with a credit rationing argument such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , where the intervention serves to ameliorate a market failure in the small firm credit market. More specifically, the results also suggest that SBA guaranteed lending will have a much larger positive impact on social welfare if it is targeted to less financially developed local markets.
Robustness Checks
Several robustness checks were performed for Equation (1) . In particular, we estimated Equation (1) separately for MSAs and non-MSA counties and using disaggregated guaranteed lending variables for the 7(a) and 504 lending programs.
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Additionally, we estimated Equation (1) using a stacked regression (OLS) approach with our panel data.
All of these robustness checks yielded results qualitatively consistent with those reported in Table 3 . Additionally, because of the potential for multicollinearity in our regressors in Equation (1), we conducted a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) analysis. Our VIF results suggest that multicollinearity was not a problem for the results reported in Table 3 . We also tested the standard errors in our regressions for possible heteroskedasticity and found that this was not a significant problem.
Additionally, we performed our analysis using different magnitudes for our measure of local market financial development. For example, our results do not change qualitatively if we change the definition of the dummy variable HIGH by using the median instead of the third quartile. That is, if we changed the definition of HIGH to equal one, zero otherwise, if the local market average annual per capita bank deposits over the sample period is greater than the median, rather than the third quartile, average annual level for our sample.
Conclusion and discussion
SBA guaranteed lending programs are one of many government sponsored market interventions aimed at promoting small business. The rationale for these guarantees is often based on the argument that credit market imperfections can result in small enterprises being credit rationed-particularly those in less financially developed markets. If SBA loan guarantees indeed reduce credit rationing of small business loans, then there should be a relationship between measures of SBA guaranteed lending activities and economic performance, and this relationship should be more apparent in less financially developed markets.
We find evidence consistent with this proposition in this study. In particular, we find a positive and significant correlation between the average annual level of employment in a local market and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that local market. And, the intensity of this correlation is relatively larger in less financially developed markets. Indeed, one interpretation of our results is that this correlation is eight times larger in less financially developed markets.
The public policy implications of our research are undeniable. It strongly suggests that the SBA should directly consider the financial development of the local market when determining the optimal allocation procedures for the budgeted quantity of lending guarantees. Local markets that are highly developed financially should receive a much lower priority in the overall guaranteed lending program. However, before we advocate this particular public policy directive, we must mention some limiting factors associated with this current empirical research.
For example, our results should be interpreted with caution for at least two reasons. First, we are unable to control for small business lending at the local market level and hence, we do not know whether SBA loan guarantees are contributing to economic performance by helping to complete the market or are simply serving as a proxy for small business lending in the market. However, even if SBA guaranteed lending is indeed just an instrument (or proxy) for overall lending to the local market, we are still led to the strong possibility that at the margin, additional credit allocation to less financially developed areas has a relatively higher level of economic impact on [1991] [1992] . RETAIL is the percentage share of employment in retail (as opposed to manufacturing, or services) as of yearend 1990 in the local market. OFFICE is the average number of commercial bank offices in the local market over the sample period. It is calculated from the FDIC's Summary of Deposit database using yearend counts of the number of offices and averaging those counts over the 1991 to 2001 period. All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars. Notes: EMPR is the average annual employment percentage rate over our sample period [1991 to 2001] in the local market. SBAPOP is the average annual amount of SBA guaranteed loan originations per capita in market i over our sample period. DEPPOP is the average over the sample period of the annual per capita bank deposits in the local market. It is calculated from the FDIC's Summary of Deposit database. It is measured in thousands of dollars per capita. HIGH is an indicator variable equal to one, zero otherwise, if the local market average annual per capita bank deposits level is higher than the third quartile (or 75 percentile) of the average annual level for our sample. PICAP is the average annual per capita income level in the local market over our sample period. It is measured in thousands of dollars per capita. EDUCAT is the percentage of local population over the age of 25 with at least four years of college as of yearend 1990.
GOVT is a measure of local government expenditures (in thousands of dollars) per capital (1991) (1992) . RETAIL is the percentage share of employment in retail (as opposed to manufacturing, or services) as of yearend 1990 in the local market. All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars. And, Pvalues are in parentheses. ) . HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, calibrated to be between zero and one, in market i over the sample period. EDUCAT is the percentage of local population over the age of 25 with at least four years of college as of yearend 1990. GOVT is a measure of local government expenditures (in thousands of dollars) per capital (1991) (1992) . RETAIL is the percentage share of employment in retail (as opposed to manufacturing, or services) as of yearend 1990 in the local market. OFFICE is the average number of commercial bank offices in the local market over the sample period. It is calculated from the FDIC's Summary of Deposit database using yearend counts of the number of offices and averaging those counts over the 1991 to 2001 period. All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars. T-statistics are in parentheses. "*" indicates significant at the 1% level. "**"indicates significant at the 5% level. "***"indicates significant at the 10% level. The model is estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) with fixed-effects conditioned on State of local market.
